ZORA Publication List

Publications

• Journal Article

  • 2011

    • Meylan, A. (2011). Introduction: The providential bad luck of justification Dialectica, 65, 483–491. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01281.x
    • Meylan, A. (2011). Epistemic circularity and the problem of cheap credit Philosophical Papers, 40, 327–340. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2011.634243

  • 2009

    • Meylan, A. (2009). Book reviws: A virtue epistemology. Apt belief and reflective knowledge - by E. Sosa Dialectica, 63, 85–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01171.x

  • 2008

    • Meylan, A. (2008). Le contrôle des croyances. Une défense de la conception déontologique de la justification Klesis, 129–136. http://www.revue-klesis.org/numeros.html

  • 2007

    • Meylan, A. (2007). Why Knowledge is Better than Mere True Belief? Against a Reliabilist Explanation CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 85–92. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-278/paper06.pdf

• Book Section

  • 2025

    • Meylan, A., & Raleigh, T. (2025). Normative relations between ignorance and suspension of judgment In V. Wagner & A. Zinke (Eds.), Suspension in epistemology and beyond (pp. 101–124). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003474302-9

  • 2022

    • Meylan, A. (2022). Doxastic Justification and Creditworthiness In L. R. G. Oliveira & P. Silva (Eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification (pp. 121–130). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003008101-10

  • 2021

    • Meylan, A. (2021). Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance In L. Moretti & N. J. L. Pedersen (Eds.), Non-evidentialist epistemology (Vol. 3, pp. 197–210). Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004465534_011

  • 2020

    • Meylan, A. (2020). The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought In K. McCain & S. Stapleford (Eds.), Epistemic Duties : New Arguments, New Angles (pp. 208–217). Routledge.
    • Meylan, A. (2020). Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief. Virtue Epistemology and the Temporal Objection In C. Kelp & J. Greco (Eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology : New Methods and Approaches (pp. 166–180). Cambridge University Press.

  • 2018

    • Meylan, A. (2018). Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems In H. Battaly (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology (pp. 317–329). Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315712550
    • Fassio, D., & Meylan, A. (2018). Passing the Epistemic Buck In C. McHugh, J. Way, & D. Whiting (Eds.), Metaethical Problems in the Epistemic Domain (pp. 46–66). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805366.003.0004
    • Meylan, A. (2018). L’intéressant In J. Deonna & E. Tieffenbach (Eds.), Petit traité des valeurs (pp. 178–186). Ithake.

  • 2017

    • Meylan, A. (2017). In support of the Knowledge-First conception of the normativity of justification In J. A. Carter, E. C. Gordon, & B. Jarvis (Eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (pp. 246–258). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0012
    • Meylan, A. (2017). The pluralism of justification In A. Coliva & N. Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (Eds.), Epistemic Pluralism (pp. 129–143). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_5

  • 2014

    • Massin, O. (2014). Qu’est-ce qu’une montagne? In O. Massin & A. Meylan (Eds.), Aristote chez les Helvètes: Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique (pp. 17–26). Ithaque.
    • Massin, O., & de Libera, A. (2014). Qu’est-ce qu’une fondue? In O. Massin & A. Meylan (Eds.), Aristote chez les Helvètes: Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique (pp. 33–40). Ithaque.
    • Meylan, A. (2014). La justification des croyances testimoniales: un malentendu ? In J.-M. Chevalier & B. Gaultier (Eds.), Connaître : questions d’épistémologie contemporaine (pp. 231–252). Ithake.
    • Massin, O., & Meylan, A. (2014). La métaphysique, c’est la science de l’être en tant qu’être, ou bien? In O. Massin & A. Meylan (Eds.), Aristote chez les Helvètes. Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique (pp. 1–3). Ithaque.
    • Meylan, A. (2014). Le contrôle des croyances In L. Jaffro (Ed.), Croit-on comme on veut? Histoire d’une controverse (pp. 223–239). Vrin.

Pagination