ZORA Publikationsliste

Publikationen

• 2025

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Meylan, A., & Van Loon, M. (2025). Against the Permission Not to Engage International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 33, 152–159. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2025.2558069
    • Meylan, A. (2025). If You Ask Yourself a Question, Seek the Answer Aristotelian Society. Proceedings. Supplementary Volume, 99, 209–232. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaf009
    • Meylan, A., & Reuter, K. (2025). On Being Ignorant Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 54, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2025.10

  • Buchkapitel

    • Meylan, A., & Raleigh, T. (2025). Normative relations between ignorance and suspension of judgment In V. Wagner & A. Zinke (Eds.), Suspension in epistemology and beyond (pp. 101–124). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003474302-9

• 2024

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Meylan, A. (2024). What do we do when we suspend judgement? Philosophical Issues, 34, 253–270. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12278
    • Meylan, A. (2024). In defence of the normative account of ignorance Erkenntnis, 89, 207–221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7

• 2023

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Meylan, A., & Schmidt, S. (2023). Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: what’s wrong with that? Philosophical Psychology, 36, 1102–1124. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2181151
    • van Loon, M., Meylan, A., & Schmidt, S. (2023). Introduction: Beyond evidence in epistemology Philosophical Topics, 51, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202351213

  • Herausgeberschaft eines wissenschaftlichen Werks

    • van Loon, M., Meylan, A., & Schmidt, S. (Eds.). (2023). Beyond evidence in epistemology : Vol. 51/2. University of Arkansas Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/e48519503

• 2022

  • Buchkapitel

    • Meylan, A. (2022). Doxastic Justification and Creditworthiness In L. R. G. Oliveira & P. Silva (Eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification (pp. 121–130). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003008101-10

• 2021

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Meylan, A. (2021). Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103, 199–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12709

  • Buchkapitel

    • Meylan, A. (2021). Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance In L. Moretti & N. J. L. Pedersen (Eds.), Non-evidentialist epistemology (Vol. 3, pp. 197–210). Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004465534_011

• 2020

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Meylan, A. (2020). Ignorance and its disvalue Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97, 433–447. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000106

  • Buchkapitel

    • Meylan, A. (2020). The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought In K. McCain & S. Stapleford (Eds.), Epistemic Duties : New Arguments, New Angles (pp. 208–217). Routledge.
    • Meylan, A. (2020). Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief. Virtue Epistemology and the Temporal Objection In C. Kelp & J. Greco (Eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology : New Methods and Approaches (pp. 166–180). Cambridge University Press.

• 2019

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Meylan, A. (2019). The reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility and the basing relation Erkenntnis, 84, 877–893. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9985-8

• 2018

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Meylan, A. (2018). L’évaluation de l’auto duperie : Butler, Clifford et la philosophie contemporaine. Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 143, 357–370. https://doi.org/10.3917/rphi.183.0357
    • Meylan, A. (2018). Justification et rationalité des émotions Philosophiques, 45, 477–487. https://doi.org/10.7202/1055274ar
    • Meylan, A. (2018). Introduction: Self-deception. New Angles Les Ateliers de l’Éthique, 13, 4. https://doi.org/10.7202/1059496ar

  • Buchkapitel

    • Meylan, A. (2018). Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems In H. Battaly (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology (pp. 317–329). Taylor & Francis. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315712550

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