ZORA Publication List

Publications

• Journal Article

  • 2025

    • Meylan, A., & Van Loon, M. (2025). Against the Permission Not to Engage International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 33, 152–159. https://doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2025.2558069
    • Meylan, A. (2025). If You Ask Yourself a Question, Seek the Answer Aristotelian Society. Proceedings. Supplementary Volume, 99, 209–232. https://doi.org/10.1093/arisup/akaf009
    • Meylan, A., & Reuter, K. (2025). On Being Ignorant Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 54, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2025.10

  • 2024

    • Meylan, A. (2024). What do we do when we suspend judgement? Philosophical Issues, 34, 253–270. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12278
    • Meylan, A. (2024). In defence of the normative account of ignorance Erkenntnis, 89, 207–221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00529-7

  • 2023

    • Meylan, A., & Schmidt, S. (2023). Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: what’s wrong with that? Philosophical Psychology, 36, 1102–1124. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2181151
    • van Loon, M., Meylan, A., & Schmidt, S. (2023). Introduction: Beyond evidence in epistemology Philosophical Topics, 51, 1–8. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202351213

  • 2021

    • Meylan, A. (2021). Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103, 199–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12709

  • 2020

    • Meylan, A. (2020). Ignorance and its disvalue Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97, 433–447. https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000106

  • 2019

    • Meylan, A. (2019). The reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility and the basing relation Erkenntnis, 84, 877–893. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9985-8

  • 2018

    • Meylan, A. (2018). L’évaluation de l’auto duperie : Butler, Clifford et la philosophie contemporaine. Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 143, 357–370. https://doi.org/10.3917/rphi.183.0357
    • Meylan, A. (2018). Justification et rationalité des émotions Philosophiques, 45, 477–487. https://doi.org/10.7202/1055274ar
    • Meylan, A. (2018). Introduction: Self-deception. New Angles Les Ateliers de l’Éthique, 13, 4. https://doi.org/10.7202/1059496ar

  • 2017

    • Meylan, A. (2017). The consequential conception of doxastic responsibility Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, 83, 4–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12110
    • Meylan, A. (2017). Rationalité et affectivité des intuitions Philosophiques, 44, 31–47. https://doi.org/10.7202/1040326ar
    • Dutant, J., Fassio, D., & Meylan, A. (2017). Introduction Synthese, 194, 1427–1431. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1352-9

  • 2015

    • Meylan, A. (2015). The legitimacy of intellectual praise and blame Journal of Philosophical Research, 40, 189–203. https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr201511537

  • 2014

    • Meylan, A. (2014). Epistemic emotions: a natural kind? Philosophical Inquiries, 2, 173–190.

  • 2013

    • Meylan, A. (2013). The value problem of knowledge: An axiological diagnosis of the credit solution Res Philosophica, 90, 261–275. https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.2013.90.2.10

  • 2012

    • Meylan, A. (2012). La justification des croyances: mentalisme, accessibilisme et déontologisme REPHA, 1–13.

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