ZORA Publication List

Publications

• 2024

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Field, Claire (2024). The value of incoherence. Philosophical Issues, 34(1):37-58.
    • Ebert, Philip A; Durbach, Ian; Field, Claire (2024). Gratuitous risk: danger and recklessness perception of adventure sports participants. Journal of the Philosophy of Sports, 51(2):267-284.
    • Field, Claire (2024). Rational belief, epistemic possibility, and the a priori. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 3(1):5.

• 2022

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Field, Claire; Jacinto, Bruno (2022). Bridge principles and epistemic norms. Erkenntnis:online.
    • Field, Claire (2022). At least you tried: the value of De Dicto concern to do the right thing. Philosophical Studies, 179(9):2707-2730.
    • Field, Claire (2022). Unsettled thoughts: a theory of degrees of rationality, by Julia Staffel. - Oxford University Press, 2019. Mind, 131(522):724-733.

• 2021

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Field, Claire (2021). Anti-exceptionalism about requirements of epistemic rationality. Acta Analytica, 36(3):423-441.
    • Field, Claire (2021). Moral appraisal for everyone: neurodiversity, epistemic limitations, and responding to the right reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 24(3):733-752.
    • Field, Claire (2021). Giving up the enkratic principle. Logos & Episteme, 12(1):7-28.

  • Buchkapitel

    • Field, Claire; Lo Re, Stefano (2021). Risky tradeoffs in the expanse. In: Nicholas, Jeffery. The expanse and philosophy: so far out into the darkness. Hoboken, NJ, 179-185.

• 2019

  • Artikel in wissenschaftlicher Zeitschrift

    • Field, Claire (2019). Recklessness and uncertainty: Jackson Cases and merely apparent asymmetry. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 16(4):391-413.
    • Field, Claire (2019). It's ok to make mistakes: against the fixed point thesis. Episteme, 16(2):175-185.
    • Field, Claire (2019). Review of Mantel, Susanne, Determined by reasons: a competence account of acting for a normative reason. - New York: Routledge, 2018.. Ethics, 129(3):484-489.