



**Universität
Zürich^{UZH}**

Institute of Philosophy
Doctoral Program "Philosophy – Language, Mind and Practice"

Master Class

Moral Realism: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and some Implications

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11th – 12th May 2017

Synopsis

In metaethics, Robust Realism is, roughly, the view according to which there are normative truths and facts that do not constitutively depend on us and our responses or judgments, and that are irreducible to or not fully groundable in natural truths. It is a view that some take as the default-view, and yet others think of as a non-starter. So it's interesting to think about it both in itself, and as an entry point to other views and to many arguments and considerations in metaethics and elsewhere in philosophy.

In this class, we will be discussing the nature of this view (compared to others); some of its metaphysical commitments (placed in a wider metaphysical context); some of its epistemological commitments (placed in a wider epistemological context); and several other related issues: the significance of moral disagreement, and the possibility of moral deference and expertise. We will conclude with a brief look at the philosophy of law, and what – if anything – the metaethical discussion can teach us about the (purported) normativity of law.

Schedule and Readings

Session 1: Robust Realism

*Enoch, D.: "Non-Naturalistic Realism in Metaethics", forthcoming in: *The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics*.

Miller, A.: *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics*, Chapter 1.

Scanlon, T. M. (2014): *Being Realistic About Reasons*, Chapter 2.

Enoch, D./McPherson, T.: "What Do You Mean 'This Isn't the Question?'" , forthcoming in a symposium on Scanlon's work in the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*.

Session 2: Robust Realism and Grounding

*Berker, S.: "The Explanatory Ambitions of Moral Principles" (manuscript).

Rosen, G.: "What is a Moral Law" (manuscript).

Session 3: Moral Epistemology for Robust Realism

*Vavova, K. (2015): "Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism", in *Philosophy Compass* 10/2, 104-116.

Enoch, D. (2010): "The Epistemological Challenge to Realism: How Best to Understand It, and How to Cope with It", in *Philosophical Studies* 148, 413–38.

Session 4: Disagreement: Metaethics and Epistemology

*Enoch, D. (2009): "How Is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?", in *The Journal of Ethics* 13(1), 15–50.

Elga, A. (2007): "Reflection and Disagreement", in *Nous* 41, 478–502.

Enoch, D. (2011): "Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (But Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement", in *Mind* 119, 953–997.

Session 5: Moral Deference

*Hills, A. (2009): "Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology", in *Ethics* 120, 94–127.

Enoch, D. (2014): "A Defense of Moral Deference", in *Journal of Philosophy* 111, 229–258.

Session 6: The Normativity of Law

*Enoch, D. (2011): "Reason-Giving and the Law", in *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law* 1, 1–38.

Plunkett, D. and Shapiro, S.: "Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Theory", forthcoming in *Ethics*.

Enoch, D. "Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?" (manuscript).

Berman, M.: "Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems" (manuscript).

Starred readings are compulsory; others optional.

Programme

Thursday, 11th May 2017

9:30 – 12:30 Robust Realism
14:30 – 16:00 Robust Realism and Grounding
16:30 – 18:00 Moral Epistemology for Robust Realism

Friday, 12th May 2017

9:30 – 12:30 Disagreement: Metaethics and Epistemology
14:30 – 16:00 Moral Deference
16:30 – 18:00 The Normativity of Law

Registration: phd@philos.uzh.ch

Details: <http://www.philosophie.uzh.ch/doktorat/meisterkurse.html>

Venue: Philosophisches Seminar, Zollikerstrasse 117, 8008 Zürich

Room: E 14

No fees apply. Participants are expected to have read the texts.

PhD students at the UZH are required to book the module in order to get credit points.