



**University of
Zurich^{UZH}**

Philosophisches Seminar
Doktoratsprogramm: „Philosophie: Sprache, Geist und Praxis“

Masterclass

Moral Responsibility

**with Prof. Paul Russell, Lund University/University of
British Columbia**

18th-21st/25th-27th October 2021



Synopsis

This course will explore the central issues and contemporary debates relating to moral responsibility. This is an issue that is both historically and philosophically intimately bound up with the free will debate. The core issues that arise concern the nature and conditions of moral responsibility and the metaphysical and normative requirements that this involves.

There will be a seminar every evening from 7.00-9pm on Monday through Thursday 18th-21st October, and meeting again on Monday through Wednesday 25th-27th October at the same time. The first seminar will introduce the challenge of scepticism about moral responsibility and will focus on the issue of moral luck. The second seminar will consider P.F. Strawson's enormously influential effort to appeal to reactive attitudes as a way of defusing and discrediting the sceptical challenge. The next three seminars will consider recent advancements and developments in both the libertarian and compatibilist approaches, as well as two other (more unorthodox) views "Hard Incompatibilism" and "Illusionism". The sixth seminar will take up the question of responsibility pluralism and will consider whether or not there is more than one concept of moral responsibility. In the last seminar we will aim to provide a different perspective on the relationship between the free will problem and our understanding of moral responsibility.



Program and Reading

Required Texts:

- Russell, P. and Oisín Deery, eds. *The Philosophy of Free Will*, P. Russell & O. Deery, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). Available online:
<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-philosophy-of-free-will-9780199733392?cc=ca&lang=en&>
- Russell, Paul. *The Limits of Free Will*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). Available through Oxford Online:
<https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190627607.001.0001/oso-9780190627607?rskey=jsDuYy&result=11>
- Handouts

Day 1 – Monday, 18th October 2021

Session 1 – MORAL LUCK & RESPONSIBILITY SCEPTICISM

19:00-19:50 – Introduction by Prof. Russell
19:50-20:00 – *Short break*
20:00-20:15 – Comment by PhD student
20:15-21:00 – Discussion

Reading:

- (i) Nagel, Thomas. (1976) "Moral Luck". [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds.: 31-42]
- (ii) Strawson, Galen. (1994) "The Impossibility of Ultimate Moral Responsibility" [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds.: 363-378]
- (iii) Dennett, Daniel. (1984) "Please Don't Feed the Bugbears" (selection from *Elbow Room*) [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds.: 43-59]

Day 2 – Tuesday, 19th October 2021

12h- 13h – LUNCH

Session 2 – RESPONSIBILITY & REACTIVE ATTITUDES: STRAWSON'S NATURALISM

19:00-19:50 – Introduction by Prof. Russell
19:50-20:00 – *Short break*
20:00-20:15 – Comment by PhD student
20:15-21:00 – Discussion

Reading:

- (i) Strawson, P.F. (1962). "Freedom and Resentment" [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds: 63-83]
- (ii) Watson, Gary. (1987) "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil" [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds: 84-113]
- (iii) Russell, Paul. (1992) "Strawson's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility" [Reprinted in Russell, *Limits*, 29-45]

Day 3 – Wednesday, 20th October 2021

Session 3 – LIBERTARIANISM, CHANCE & LUCK

19:00-19:50 – Introduction by Prof. Russell
19:50-20:00 – *Short break*
20:00-20:15 – Comment by PhD student
20:15-21:00 – Discussion



Reading:

- (i) Kane, Robert. (1999) "Responsibility, Luck and Chance" [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, ed.: 193-214]
- (ii) Steward, Helen. (2011) "Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency". In R. Swinburne, ed. *Free Will and Modern Science* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 141-157.
- (iii) Mele, Al. (2014). "Luck and Free Will", *Metaphilosophy*, 45.4-5:543-556.

Day 4 – Thursday, 21st October 2021

Session 4 – COMPATIBILISM AND RATIONAL AGENCY

19:00-19:50 – Introduction by Prof. Russell
19:50-20:00 – *Short break*
20.00-20:15 – Comment by PhD student
20:15-21:00 – Discussion

Reading:

1. Wolf, Susan. (1987) "Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility" [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds.: 281-295]
2. Fischer, John. (2013) "My Compatibilism", [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds.: 296-317]
3. Double, Richard. (1989) "Puppeteers, Hyponotists, and Neurosurgeons" [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds.: 267-275]

Day 5 – Monday, 25th October 2021

Session 5 – HARD INCOMPATIBILISM & ILLUSIONISM

19:00-19:50 – Introduction by Prof. Russell
19:50-20:00 – *Short break*
20.00-20:15 – Comment by PhD student
20:15-21:00 – Discussion

Reading:

- (i) Pereboom, Derk. (2013) "Optimistic Skepticism about Free Will". [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds.]
- (ii) Smilansky, Saul. (2001) "Free Will: From Nature to Illusion" [Reprinted in Russell & Deery, eds.: 379-399]
- (iii) Feinberg, Joel. (1962) "Justice and Personal Desert". Reprinted in *What Do We Deserve?* L.P. Pojman & O. McLeod, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),

Day 6 – Monday, 26th October 2021

Session 6 – RESPONSIBILITY PLURALISM

19:00-19:50 – Introduction by Prof. Russell
19:50-20:00 – *Short break*
20.00-20:15 – Comment by PhD student
20:15-21:00 – Discussion

Reading:

- (i) Watson, Gary. (1992) "Two Faces of Responsibility". Reprinted in *Agency and Answerability*, G. Watson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 260-288.
- (ii) Shoemaker, David. (2011) "Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability"; *Ethics* 121.3: 602-632.
- (iii) Smith, Angie. (2012). "Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account", *Ethics* 122.3: 575-589.



- (iv) Talbert, Matt. (2012) "Accountability, Aliens, and Psychopaths: A Reply to Shoemaker", *Ethics* 122.3: 562-574.

Day 6 – Monday, 26th October 2021

Session 7 – FREE WILL PESSIMISM

19:00-19:50 – Introduction by Prof. Russell

19:50-20:00 – *Short break*

20:00-20:15 – Comment by PhD student

20:15-21:00 – Discussion

Reading:

- (i) Russell, Paul. (2017) "Free Will Pessimism" [Reprinted in Russell, *Limits*, 243-275.]
- (ii) Williams, Bernard. (1985). "How Free Does the Will Need to Be?" Reprinted in B. Williams, *Making Sense of Humanity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1995), 3-21.
- (iii) Russell, Paul "Free Will and the Tragic Predicament: Making Sense of Williams" [Handout]
- (iv) Cuypers, Stefaan. (2013) "Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist Fatalism", *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 16.1: 173-188.

Error! No text of specified style in document.
Error! No text of specified style in document.

Error! No text of specified style in document.