Summer school

Conceptual Analysis

Julia Tanney
Frank Jackson
Constantine Sandis
Hans-Johann Glock

Villa Garbald/Castasegna
14th – 19th August 2016
Programme

Sunday, 14th August

19:00  Meeting/dinner

Monday, 15th August

9:30 – 12:30  Opening session/Introduction (FJ/HG)


14:00 – 15:30  Analysis vs. Elucidation (CS)


16:00 – 18:00  Three grades of involvement in conceptual analysis (FJ)


Tuesday, 16th August

9:30 – 12:30  A filing system for expressions: the consequences of ‘systematic ambiguity’ (JT)

14:00 – 15:30 Conceptual Analysis for Non-Representationalists (HG)


16:00 – 18:00 Impure Conceptual Analysis (HG)


Wednesday, 17th August

9:30 – 12:30 Two dimensionalism and the debate over conceptual analysis (FJ)


Thursday, 18th August

9:30 – 12:30 The priority of informal logic (JT)


14:00 – 15:30 Experimental Philosophy & Ordinary Language (CS)


16:00 – 16:50 Analytic Statements Revisited – H. Valchev
17:00 – 17:50 Can empirical research falsify conceptual analyses? – R. Gubelmann

Friday, 19th August

9:30 – 10:20 On Some Categories of Contemporary Metaethics – M. Meliopolous
10:30 – 11:20 Some Thoughts Concerning Williamson’s ‘Conceptual Truth’ – F. Bieber
11:30 – 12:10 Explication and Conceptual Pluralism – M. Rolffs

12:15 Lunch, trip back to Zurich
Synopsis

The summer school will focus on two fundamental questions:

- What is conceptual analysis?
- What are its strengths and weaknesses as a philosophical method?

Conceptual analysis played a very significant role in analytic philosophy up to the 1960s, when, in part under the influence of Quinean naturalism, it fell seriously out of favour. In the last 20 years or so, however, conceptual analysis has returned to the philosophical mainstream and is the subject of heated debate.

Frank Jackson has attempted to rehabilitate conceptual analysis within the framework of two-dimensional semantics, which draws on the realist semantics of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam. David Chalmers, Robert Stalnaker and Ned Block soon joined that debate. At the same time there has been a renaissance of ‘classic’ conceptual analysis of a loosely speaking pragmatist orientation. Its figureheads include Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle and Peter Strawson, and it is pursued by Avner Baz, Peter Hacker and Julia Tanney among others.

Timothy Williamson’s (2007) outspoken critique of conceptual analysis and of analyticity has generated a new phase in the debate, provoking responses e.g. from Severin Schroeder and Hans-Johann Glock. Finally, the rise of experimental philosophy raises the question of how conceptual analysis is related to empirical linguistics and psychology, a debate to which Constantine Sandis has contributed.

We will subject all these developments to critical scrutiny, covering not just metaphilosophical topics but also issues in the philosophy of mind, language and action.